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GONZALES V. OREGON AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE: ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES

Ken Levy*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1990, the United States Supreme Court has issued three major decisions on
3
1
2
euthanasia: Crozan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Vacca v. Quil/, and
4
Last term, the Court issued a decision, Gonzales v.
Washington v. Glucksberg.
5
Oregon, that discussed euthanasia but turned almost entirely on other issues, primarily
statutory interpretation and the legitimate scope of the United States Attorney General's
authority over medical policy among the fifty States. So Gonzales did not really advance
the euthanasia debate very far. Still, the debate that it did provoke is interesting and
worth further investigation, less for constitutional reasons and more for ethical and
public policy reasons.
The incidental debate focused on whether or not physician-assisted suicide-i.e.,
"a physician('s] facilitat[ing] a patient's death by providing the necessary means and/or
6
information to enable the patient to perform the life-ending act" -serves a "legitimate
7
While the majority held that it does serve a legitimate medical
medical purpose."

* J.D., Columbia University Law School; Ph.D., Philosophy, Rutgers University; B.A., Philosophy,
Williams College. Member, New York State Bar. Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law
School. Former Visiting Teaching Fellow, Columbia University Law School.

I would like to thank Russell

Christopher, I. Glenn Cohen, Dr. Lenore Day, Dr. Stuart Levy, and Jed Shugerman for helpful discussions
about physician-assisted suicide; Dr. Robert Cassidy and Dr. Gulay Sezgin for lending me an impressive
collection of literature on physician-assisted suicide; and the editors at the Tulsa Law Review for their
excellent revisions and recommendations.
I. Euthanasia is "commonly defined as the act of bringing about the death of a hopelessly ill and suffering
person in a relatively quick and painless way for reasons of mercy." Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs,

American Medical Association (AMA), Decisions near the End ofLife, 267 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2229, 2229
(1992).
2. 497 u.s. 261 (1990).
3. 521 u.s. 793 (1997).
4. 521 u.s. 702 (1997).
5. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
6. Physician-Assisted Suicide, AMA Code of Ethics § E-2.211, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/print/8459.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2005); Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. I, at 2229.
7. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 915 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2000) and 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04

(2005)). See also Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin, Introduction: A Medical, Ethical, Legal, and
Psychosocial Perspective, in The Case against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care (Kathleen

Foley and Herbert Hendin eds., Johns Hopkins U. Press 2002) ("In physician-assisted suicide, the patient self
administers the lethal dose that has been prescribed by a physician who knows the patient intends to use it to
end his or her life.")
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purpose, Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Thomas took the opposite position in their dissent.
tJnf:t lli\l flntely, the majority did not indicate what this legitimate purpose is. So we are
ttill left to fill in this blank ourselves. This article offers the most obvious way to fill in
th s blank-namely, alleviation of suffering.
This article will

then survey-and reject-some ethical arguments against

physician-assisted suicide.

But the ultimate conclusion of this article is not that

physician-assisted suicide should be legalized. Rather, the ultimate conclusion of this
ltrticle is that States should think very long and hard before they follow Oregon's
example and legalize physician-assisted suicide within their own borders. For

even

if

there are no decisive ethical objections against physician-assisted suicide, it does raise
serious policy worries.

Perhaps the most important among them is that the very

legalization of physician-assisted suicide would likely pressure too many terminally ill
patients into exercising this option unnecessarily early and for the wrong reasons-not to
alleviate their own suffering but to minimize the burden, inconvenience, and economic
8
expense that they fear their continued existence would impose on others.
II.

THE ROAD TO GONZALES

V.

OREGON

The debate about whether or not physician-assisted suicide serves a legitimate
medical purpose has hardly arisen in a vacuum. Rather, it has arisen directly out of the
decisions issued in-and questions unresolved by-three previous cases dealing with the
"right to die": Cruzan, Vacco, and G/ucksberg.

This part summarizes the issues and

arguments in these decisions, including the concurring and dissenting opinions, that are
related closely enough to physician-assisted suicide.
Cruzan

A.

1.

The Majority

In Cruzan, the majority interpreted the central question to be whether or not Nancy
Cruzan, who had been in an automobile accident that left her in a permanent vegetative
state, had a constitutional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that she did. According to
Rehnquist, Cruzan had a "constitutionally protected liberty interest" in refusing
unwanted medical treatment, a liberty interest that derives from the Fourteenth
9
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
This conclusion, however, raised a problem. Because Cruzan was in a vegetative
state, it was impossible to ask her directly whether or not she wished to remain on life
support. So her desires had to be ascertained in some other, less direct, way-namely,
from evidence proffered by her family, friends, and guardian ad litem.

8.

Chief Justice

This article will discuss but not evaluate arguments for and against our having a constitutional right to

physician-assisted suicide. For an eloquent defense of the proposition that a constitutional right to physician
assisted suicide should be recognized, see John Rawls et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers· Brief, 44 N.Y.
Rev. Bks. 41 (Mar.

9.

27, 1997).
278. The

497 U.S. at

Due Process Clause provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV,

§ I.
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Rehnquist argued that, in order to remove Cruzan's life support, this evidence had to
establish to a "clear and convincing" degree that she wanted, or would have chosen in a
conscious and competent state, to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. For only this high
standard would lead to the correct distribution of the risk of error. On the one hand, if
Cruzan's life support were removed against her wishes, then her right of self
determination would be irreversibly violated; once she was dead, there would be no
bringing her back.

If, on the other hand, Cruzan's life support continued against her

wishes, then, while her right of self-determination would be violated, this violation
would still be reversible.

The possibility would remain that clear and convincing

evidence that Cruzan (would have) wished to die would arrive. And if it did, the hospital
10
could at that time fulfill Cruzan's wishes and remove her life support.
2.

Justice Scalia's Concurrence

In his concurrence, Justice Scalia pointed out that the petitioners, Cruzan's parents,
had a difficult obstacle to overcome.

States may clearly pass laws prohibiting suicide

without violating the Due Process Clause. Yet the petitioners were trying to demonstrate
that States like Missouri were violating the Due Process Clause by forbidding Cruzan's
parents from withdrawing her life support. So petitioners had to demonstrate that there is
a distinction between suicide and refusal of lifesaving medical treatment and that this
distinction is constitutionally relevant. Accordingly, petitioners attempted to draw three
distinctions that satisfied both of these criteria. The second of these distinctions, which
only Justice Scalia discussed, was that refusal "would bring on [Cruzan's] death not by
11

any affirmative act but by merely declining treatment that provides nourishment."

"Suicide, it is said, consists of an affirmative act to end one's life; refusing treatment is
not an affirmative act 'causing' death, but merely a passive acceptance of the natural
12
process of dying."
Justice Scalia correctly identified this distinction as a species of the more general
distinction between

"action and

inaction,"

which

is more

commonly

known in

philosophy, criminal law, and tort law as the distinction between positive action and

omission.

Justice Scalia then argued that this distinction between positive action and

omission is morally-and therefore constitutionally-irrelevant.

For, all else being

equal, action and omission are both intention- and outcome-equivalent. They are merely
different means to the same deliberately-sought end.

For example, a parent is equally

guilty of homicide whether she actively poisons her child or deliberately allows her child
starve to death.

It does not matter that the parent performs a positive action in one

situation (administering poison) and performs no positive action in the other (stands idly
13
by). Either way, the parent equally intends the child's death and the child equally dies.
Rather than dismissing the positive action-omission distinction entirely, Justice

10. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283.
11. !d. at 295. The two other distinctions were that Cruzan was "permanently incapacitated and in pain"
and that "preventing her from effectuating her presumed wish to die requires violation of her bodily integrity."
/d.

12. !d. at 296.
13. !d. at 296-97
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Scalia made two positive suggestions.

First, he suggested that the positive action

omission distinction was not entirely irrelevant, that it "has some bearing upon the
legislative judgment of what ought to be prevented as suicide" and could be "discerned
14
by logic or legal analysis."
Second, Justice Scalia suggested that the positive action
omission distinction was not far away from the more appropriate distinction. According
to Justice Scalia, the line should be drawn not between positive action and omission but
rather between "various forms" of omission-namely, omisstons "that consist of
abstaining from 'ordinary' care and [omissions] that consist of abstaining from
15
'excessive' or 'heroic' measures."
Curiously, however, Scalia's second suggestion ended there. He did not explain
why this distinction between omission of ordinary measures and omission of heroic
measures is important or relevant.

So it is difficult to see exactly what point Justice

Scalia was making. Was he suggesting that withdrawal of life support is constitutionally
protected when, and only when, it involves the omission of heroic measures? Was he
suggesting that the distinction between omission of ordinary measures and omission of
heroic measures is morally relevant but still constitutionally irrelevant?
16
else altogether? It is not clear.

3.

Or something

Justice Stevens' Dissent

17
and the
Two different dissenting opinions were offered, one by Justice Stevens
18
other by Justice Brennan.
Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun.
Justice Stevens argued that the majority should have assigned greater weight to
19

Cruzan's own best interests than to the State's interest in preserving and protecting life.

The main challenge for Justice Stevens was to demonstrate that withdrawal of life
support was indeed in Cruzan's best interests in the first place.

He could not simply

assume this point because it would beg the question against those who believe that life is
always preferable to death and therefore that it is always in a person's best interests to
remain alive as long as possible, even if her life is impoverished to the level of a
persistent vegetative state, than to die. Justice Stevens challenged this position with two
arguments.
First, Justice Stevens argued that whether or not a person has an interest in

14. /d. at 296.
15. Jd.
16. The distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" treatments is sometimes thought to align with
the distinction between treatment that ethically must be provided and treatment that morally may be withheld
or withdrawn. See Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. 1, at 2230. But there are two problems with this
position. First, the line between ordinary and extraordinary is difficult to draw. /d. at 2230-31. Second, the
ordinary-extraordinary distinction seems to be non-moral; the determination of whether or not a given
treatment is morally obligatory should be determined by moral, not (solely) non-moral, considerations. /d.
17. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 330-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. Jd. at 301-30 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
19. See also Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual
Freedom 12-13 (Alfred A. Knopf 1993) (distinguishing between the "detached" claim that a person's life
should be preserved because human life is sacred and the "derivative" claim that a person's life should be
preserved because she has a right to continue, and interest in continuing, to live).
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remaining alive depends on whether or not her life has value for her. And, life abstracted
from the person has no value for her. Rather, a person ' s life has value for her only if it
reaches, or has the potential to reach, a certain minimal degree of quality-namely,
consciousness without inordinate suffering.

So if a given person ' s life does not and

cannot reach this level, such as in Cruzan' s case, it does not have sufficient value for that
0
person and that person therefore does not have an interest in remaining alive ?
Second, Justice Stevens offered a two-part argument.

First, even if Cruzan did

have an interest in remaining alive, she had other interests that outweighed her interest in
remaining alive. These other interests included how she would be remembered by "those
whose opinions mattered to her," how she would want to be remembered, the integrity of
her body, her dignity, and her personhood.

Second, these other interests-which took

precedence over Cruzan' s purported interest in staying alive-were better served by
21
withdrawal, rather than continuation, of life support.
Justice Stevens' dissent focused on Cruzan' s best interests, which are independent
of her (prior) desires. And independence entails potential conflict. We often do not want
what is in our best interests. For example, it is in a child's best interests to get certain
vaccinations even if she would prefer not to be pricked with a needle. One problem with
Justice Stevens' position is that he did not explore this possible difficulty.

Justice

Stevens' position arguably commits him to the position that a persistent vegetative
patient' s best interests trump her (prior-expressed) wishes, whatever they might be.

So

even if a patient in a persistent vegetative state previously expressed a desire to stay
indefinitely on life support, Justice Stevens' position arguably entails that this desire is
not dispositive, that the patient should still be terminated if it would better serve the
memories of those close to her, the integrity of her body, her dignity, and her
personhood. This conclusion seems a bit harsh and counterintuitive, no less inconsistent
22
with the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
4.

Justice Brennan's Dissent

Perhaps aware of this weakness in Justice Stevens' advocacy of a best-interests
standard, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that the standard should instead be
Cruzan ' s autonomy, her self-determination, what she wanted or would have wanted in
He agreed with the majority that people like Cruzan have a
23
constitutional "right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration."

her current situation.

Still, Justice Brennan diverged from the majority on five main issues. First, he felt

20. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 344-47, 356-57.
2 1 . /d. at 344, 350-51, 355-56.
22. Of course, the potential conflict between autonomy and best interests may work in the opposite
direction as well.

It may be the case that the patient wishes to die, and this wish conflicts with her best

interests. (Indeed, it is fear of this particular situation that motivates much, if not most, opposition to legalizing
physician-assisted suicide.) Lois Shepherd makes a similar point about the potential conflict between
autonomy and dignity. See Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy after Washington v. Glucksberg: An Essay
about Ab ortion, Death, and Crime, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Policy 43 1, 453-55 (1998).
23. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302. We have now come across three different considerations that are used in
determining whether or not withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment is constitutionally protected: the
patient's autonomy, the patient's best interests, and the intrinsic value or sanctity of the patient's life.
Dworkin, supra n. 19, at 26, 190-98.

See
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that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment was not merely an important "liberty
24
interest" but fundamental.
Second, he argued that Missouri's interest in preserving life
was not sufficiently important--at least not as important as Cruzan's contrary wish to
25
discontinue life support.
Third, Justice Brennan argued that, contrary to both the
Missouri Supreme Court and the majority, the evidence that Cruzan wanted withdrawal
26
of life support was clear and convincing .
Fourth, he argued that not only a decision to
discontinue unwanted life support but also a decision to continue life support inflicted
27
irreversible damage.
Fifth, he argued that if there is not clear and convincing evidence
regarding what the patient wanted, the decision regarding what to do with the patient
should not automatically "escheat" to the State but should instead be directed to "the
person whom the patient himself would most likely have chosen as proxy or . . . the
28
patient's family."
B.

Vacco
In Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that even non-terminally ill patients

have the constitutional right to refuse non-lifesaving medical treatment because forced
medical treatment, even though non-lifesaving, would violate their "liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment" just as much as forced lifesaving medical
29
treatment.
It goes without saying that there is an important distinction between the
right to withdraw non-lifesaving medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide: only
the latter will lead to death.

So it would not be very convincing for proponents of

physician-assisted suicide to argue that people have a constitutionally protected right to
physician-assisted

suicide because

(a)

withdrawal

of

any medical

treatment

is

constitutionally protected and (b) there is no principled distinction between physician
assisted suicide and the withdrawal of any medical treatment. Rather, if this argument is
to have any possibility of success, (a) and (b) should be restricted to lifesaving medical
30
treatment.
In Vacco, it was precisely

(b) that

was at issue. The central question was whether

or not there is a meaningful distinction between physician-assisted suicide and
31
withdrawal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.
(As discussed above, in his

Cruzan concurrence, Justice Scalia had the foresight to confront this same issue.)
Respondents offered the following argument for striking down New York State's
ban on physician-assisted suicide: (a) all else being equal, there is no meaningful
difference between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of unwanted lifesaving

2 4.
25.
26.
2 7.
28.
29.
30.
(1996 )

49 7U.S. at 304 -05.
312-14.
ld. at 319 321 25
Id. at 320 -2 1; see also Dworkin, supra n. 19, at 196 -98;
Cruzan, 497U.S. a t 328 (footnote omitted).
Jd. at 2 77-79 .
Cruzan,

Jd. at

,

-

.

Rawls et al., supra n.

See David Orentlicher, The Legalization ofPhysician-Assisted Suicide,

8,

335 New

at

4 6.

Eng. J. Med.

663, 665

(noting irony of notion that while a young person depressed from the breakup of a romantic relationship

has the constitutional right to withdrawal of ventilator treatment for her asthma, a very elderly terminally ill
person in great pain does not have the constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide).

3 1.

Vacco,

521 U.S.

at

793 (1997).
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medical treatment; (b) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
32
requires States to treat like cases alike; therefore, (c) physician-assisted suicide should
receive

the same

constitutional protection that withdrawal of lifesaving medical

treatment received in Cruzan.

But the Court disagreed.

Contrary to (a), Chief Justice

Rehnquist's majority opinion held that there are meaningful differences between
physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment,
differences that are both "widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and
33
in our legal traditions"and "important and logical . . . certainly rationa1 ."
The first such distinction lies in intent.

In both cases, the doctor expects or

foresees that the patient will die sooner than she otherwise would. But in only one of
these situations-physician-assisted suicide-is this result actually intended. The doctor
does not intend this result if she merely withdraws life support. Instead, she intends
"only" to respect her patient's wishes and thereby enable the patient to maintain her
34
autonomy and dignity.
Chief Justice Rehnquist added that what applies to withdrawal
35
of life support also applies to "aggressive palliative care."
Like the former, the latter
may hasten the patient's death-i.e., may lead the patient to die earlier than she would
36
have without the palliative medication -"but the physician's purpose and intent is, or
37
Rehnquist's theory here is commonly known
may be, only to ease his patient's pain."
as the "Doctrine of Double Effect." The Doctrine of Double Effect holds that actions
producing certain negative outcomes are morally permissible, even if these outcomes
38
were reasonably foreseeable, as long as the outcomes were unintended.
The second distinction lies in causation. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that how
the doctor helps her patient to die determines the actual cause of the patient's death. On
the one hand, if the doctor helps her patient to commit suicide by prescribing a lethal
medication, then the cause of the patient's death is the medication. On the other hand, if
the doctor withdraws life support, then the cause of the patient's death is the "underlying
39
fatal disease or pathology."
So the patient's death can be directly attributed to the
doctor only in the case of physician-assisted suicide, not in the case of withdrawal of life
40
support.
In his discussion of the second distinction-causation-Chief Justice Rehnquist

3 2.

The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ I.

33. Vacca, 521 U.S� at 800-01 (footnote omitted).
34. !d. at 801-03.
35. !d. at 802.
36. See Leon R. Kass, 'I will Give No Deadly Dntg ': Why Doctors Must Not Kill, in Foley & Hendin, supra
n. 7, at 34, 37; Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the
Terminally Ill, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 7 99, 819 nn. 61, 62 (1 994) ; Student Author, Physician-Assisted
Suicide, Ill Harv. L. Rev. 237, 247 (1997); Shepherd, supra n. 22, at 465 n. 157.
37 . Vacca, 521 U.S. at 802.
38. See Kass, supra n. 36, at 36- 37 ; Yale Kamisar, The Rise and Fall of the 'Right' to Assisted Suicide, in
Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7, at 81-82. But see Joan C. Callahan, Acts, Omissions, and Euthanasia, 2 Pub.
Affairs Q. 21 (1 988) (arguing that the Doctrine of Double Effect is conceptually and morally problematic).
3 9. Vacca, 521 U.S. at 801.
40. See also Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics ! 51 (Yale U. Press 1970)
("In omission no human agent causes the patient's death, directly or indirectly. He dies his own death from
causes that it is no longer merciful or reasonable to fight by means of possible medical interventions.").
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actually offered a third distinction: the consequences of prohibition. He argued that the
Cruzan Court determined that patients have a constitutional right to refuse lifesaving
medical treatment on the basis of "well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity
41
and freedom from unwanted touching.',
A State that prohibited withdrawal of life
support would effectively be forcing some patients to undergo unwanted lifesaving
medical treatment, which is a form of battery.

Rehnquist then implied that the same

cannot be said of physician-assisted suicide. Presumably what he had in mind was that
States' prohibiting doctors from prescribing lethal medication does not force patients to
suffer any violations to their "bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching." It
42
does not force patients to do anything. Instead, it exerts force only upon doctors.
C.

Glucksberg
Vacca was the companion case to Glucksberg. Again, the Vacca Court held that

New York State's

prohibition

against physician-assisted

suicide did not violate
43
In Glucksberg,
terminally ill patients' Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights.
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the State of Washington's prohibition against

physician-assisted suicide did not violate terminally ill patients' Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process rights.
1.

The Majority

Importantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision was not that physician-assisted
suicide violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and therefore must be
prohibited.

It was only that physician-assisted suicide is not protected by the Due

Process Clause and therefore may be prohibited. Naturally, this proposition is consistent
with a State's decision to permit physician-assisted suicide. As Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded, "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
,44
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist offered several arguments for the majority's conclusion
that physician-assisted suicide is not protected by the Due Process Clause.

First, he

argued that while Cruzan held that patients have a constitutional right to refuse unwanted
lifesaving medical treatment, this right does not entail or encompass a further right to
receive assistance from a doctor in terminating their lives.

As he did in Vacca,

Rehnquist argued that, despite their superficial resemblance, the two practices are
45
substantively distinct enough to warrant different legal treatment.
Second, Rehnquist argued that if people do not have a right to perform a certain

41. Vacco, 521 U. S. at 807 (citing Cntzan, 497 U. S. at 278-79,287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
42. See also New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death Is Sought: Assisted Suicide and

Euthanasia in the Medical Context 105, I13 (2d. ed., Jan. 2000); Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 663 (describing a

fourth possible distinction "between assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment . . . as a
useful proxy, or substitute, for distinguishing between morally acceptable and morally unacceptable decisions
by patients to end their lives.").

43. Vacca, 521 U. S. at 797.
44. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
45. !d. at 724-26.
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action, then they certainly do not have a right to receive assistance in performing that
46
Therefore people
action. As it turns out, people do not have a right to commit suicide.
do not have a right to receive assistance in committing suicide.
reasons that people do not have a right to commit suicide.

There are two main
The first reason: the

prohibition against suicide is deeply rooted in "our Nation's history, legal traditions, and
47
practices.',
Similarly, most States, not to mention most Western democracies, have
48
criminalized physician-assisted suicide.
While not dispositive, this fact certainly casts
some doubt on the notion that physician-assisted suicide is a right, no less a fundamental
49
The second reason: the State has a compelling interest in prohibiting suicide
right.
namely, the preservation of human life, especially life that does not necessarily involve a
50
future of illness and suffering.
Third, Rehnquist argued that, in addition to the preservation of human life, the
State has several other compelling interests that motivate prohibiting physician-assisted
suicide. These other interests include "protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical
51
profession";
"protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and
disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, . . . mistakes . .. coercion . .. prejudice, negative
52
and protecting society against

and inaccurate stereotypes, and 'societal indifference'";

rolling down the slippery slope from physician-assisted suicide to "voluntary and
53
perhaps even involuntary euthanasia."
(These concerns will be discussed further in
Part IV below.)
Regarding this last point, a doctor commits involuntary euthanasia when she
54
performs euthanasia without the patient's informed consent
and voluntary euthanasia
55
Because
when she performs euthanasia with the patient's informed consent.
56
involuntary euthanasia "would never be ethically acceptable,"
we need no further
explanation why Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected it.

But why did he reject voluntary

euthanasia as well? Although he did not give the reason, Rehnquist most likely had in
mind scenarios in which a doctor, for her own ulterior reasons, helps suicidal patients to
die unnecessarily early-i.e., when these patients are suffering not from terminal
illnesses or incurable pain but rather from depression that might very well have been
treated. This kind of euthanasia-though voluntary-would still be highly undesirable
because it would lead to the deaths of patients who, had they resisted or been forced to
resist their suicidal impulses, might very well have overcome their depression and gone

46.
47.
48.
49.

!d. at 711.

!d. at 710,711-14.

!d. at 710-11,714-18.

!d. at 723, 728; see also Gonzales, Petr.'s Br., 2005 WL 1126079 at *24 (May 12, 2005) (indicating that
"Congress passed a broad ban on the federal funding of assisted suicide" in 1997 and that "physician-assisted

suicide is not eligible for reimbursement under Medicare because it is 'not reasonable and necessary to the
diagnosis and treatment of disease or injury"' (citation omitted)).

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Glucksberg,
!d. at 731.

521 U.S. at 728-29.

!d. at 731-32 (citation omitted).
!d. at 732.

Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. I, at 2229.

Jd.
!d.
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on to lead fulfilling and productive lives.

2.

57

Concurring Opinions

Four

Justices-Souter,

opinions in

Glucksberg.

Breyer,

O'Connor,

and

Stevens-offered

concurring

All of them drew attention to a third possibility "in between"

physician-assisted suicide, which they agreed is not constitutionally protected, and
58
refusal of lifesaving medical treatment, which is constitutionally protected.
This third
possibility, which was already discussed in Part I.B above, was a doctor's administering
to terminally ill patients suffering excruciating pain palliative drugs that have the side
59
effect of hastening death.
The point that all four Justices made with this third
possibility is that it is legal, at least in New York and Washington, and therefore renders
physician-assisted suicide unnecessary.

Even if doctors do not have the option of

prescribing lethal drugs for terminally ill patients, they may achieve a similar outcome
by prescribing palliative but death-hastening treatment instead. Of course, this argument
would fail for any State that decided to criminalize palliative but death-hastening
treatment.

But because no State has yet legislated any such prohibition, the Justices
60
remained content with the status quo.

3.

Justice Stevens' Concurring Opinion

Justice Stevens was the only member of the Court to recognize that the very
legality of palliative but death-hastening treatment has important implications for what
would later become a central issue in

Gonzales:

the purpose of medicine.

Justice

Stevens stated:
The fear is that a rule permitting physicians to assist in suicide is inconsistent with the
perception that they serve their patients solely as healers. But for some patients, it would
be a physician's refusal to dispense medication to ease their suffering and make their death
tolerable and dignified that would be inconsistent with the healing role. . . .

[B]ecause

physicians are already involved in making decisions that hasten the death of terminally ill
patients--through termination of life support, withholding of medical treatment, and

57. See also Glucksherg, 52! U.S. at 782-86 (Souter, J., concurring).
58. ld. at 737-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 751 (Stevens, J., concurring), 780 (Souter, J., concurring),
791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
59. But see New York State Task Force, supra n. 42, at 109 n. 115 (noting that the National Hospice
Organization has adopted a resolution that '"reaffirms the hospice philosophy that hospice care neither hastens
nor postpones death"' (citation omitted)).

60. But see

Vacco, Respt. ' s Br.,

1996 WL 708912 at **8-9 (Dec. 10, 1996) (citations omitted):

Palliative medication is of course available to ease many patients' physical pain.

But it is

undisputed that for others, especially those dying of some forms of cancer and those particularly
near death, it may be impossible to relieve their excruciating pain or other physical symptoms. In
addition, some patients may be unable to receive relief from pain because of their violent physical
or psychological reactions to high doses of opiates. Palliative medication also has no effect on the
suffering that may be brought on by a patient's own anguish, physical degeneration and loss of
dignity. Further, at levels at which it may be effective, such medication may have the effect of
impairing mental acuity. Many patients find--especially near the end--that they cannot obtain the
required level of pain relief before losing whatever clarity of mind is otherwise left to them for
communicating with loved ones, praying, or coming to terms with their impending death. Although
these patients may be prepared to die, they are confronted instead only with intolerable
suffering--the suffering of their own pain or of opiate-induced oblivion.
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terminal sedation-there is in fact significant tension between the traditional view of the
physician's role and the actual practice in a growing number of cases.

Justice Stevens was groping toward a significant insight.

61

The passage above suggests

that palliative but death-hastening treatment is both consistent and in "significant
tension" with a doctor's "healing role."

This apparent opposition, however, can be

dissolved. Justice Stevens' point would have been more effective had he suggested that,
in addition to healing, doctors serve another purpose as well: alleviation of suffering.
For then Justice Stevens would not have had to try to fit the round peg of palliative but
death-hastening treatment into the square hole of healing. Instead, he would have been
able to fit this round peg into the equally round hole of alleviation. Moreover, as will be
shown below, this suggestion would have had the fringe benefit of giving Justice
Kennedy a strong point to use and Justice Scalia a compelling challenge to overcome in
their respective Gonzales opinions.
4.

Justice Souter's Concurring Opinion

In a part of his concurring opinion, Justice Souter strayed from the central
constitutional questions to offer a public policy argument for the conclusion that
criminalization of physician-assisted suicide is preferable to legalization. Justice Souter
argued that some of the State interests mentioned by Chief Justice Rehnquist-namely,
"protecting vulnerable groups" and protecting society against rolling down the slippery
slope from physician-assisted suicide to "voluntary and perhaps even involuntary
euthanasia"-were sufficient reasons for prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.

Justice

Souter based his argument on empirical evidence obtained from the Netherlands, one of
the few countries that has legalized physician-assisted suicide. Studies showed that even
Dutch laws permitting physician-assisted suicide that were layered with safeguards
Jaws "with teeth"-had been unable to prevent these interests from being impaired.
Justice Souter concluded from this data that, until sufficient countervailing evidence
becomes available, the safer course is for States to continue prohibiting physician
assisted suicide rather than passing Jaws, even "with teeth," that permit this (potentially)
62
dangerous practice.
D.

Gonzales

The central issue in Gonzales was whether or not the Controlled Substances Act
63
allowed "the United States Attorney General to prohibit doctors from
(CSA)
prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state
64

Jaw permitting the procedure. "
General this power.

The Court held that CSA did not grant the Attorney

Most of its decision was based on the application of canons of

statutory interpretation to the text of CSA.

61.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 748-49 (footnote omitted).

62. Jd. at 782-87.
63.

Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).

64.

Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 911.
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Case History

A brief history of Gonzales is in order. In 1994, Oregon became the first State to
65
pass a ballot measure legalizing physician-assisted suicide.
The resulting Death with
66
Dignity Act (DWDA) exempts from criminal or civil liability state-licensed physicians
who, in compliance with DWDA's safeguards, dispense or prescribe lethal doses
drugs to terminally ill patients who wish to die.

of

In 1997, Oregon voters reaffirmed

Oregon's DWDA by rejecting a ballot measure proposing to invalidate it.
On November 9, 2001, soon after Senator John Ashcroft had become the United
States Attorney General, he issued a directive (the Ashcroft Directive) declaring that
67
CSA, which

Oregon's DWDA conflicted with CSA and therefore was invalid.

Congress passed in 1970, was designed to combat drug abuse and control the legitimate
and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances by creating a comprehensive regulatory
regime criminalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution, dispensation, and
possession of substances that are questionable insofar as they have a potential for abuse
or dependence, do not have an accepted medical use, or are not considered sufficiently
safe for use under medical supervision.

Attorney General Ashcroft declared that

substances prescribed by doctors for the purpose of assisting terminally ill patients to end
their lives violated CSA.

Therefore, contrary to Oregon's DWDA, "appropriate

administrative action" could still be taken against doctors who issued such prescriptions.
Attorney General Ashcroft based his interpretation of CSA on the application of
two key concepts.

The first came from a regulation issued in 1971 by then-Attorney

General John Mitchell, which stated in part: "A prescription for a controlled substance to
be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner
68
acting in the usual course of his professional practice."
The second concept came from
a 1984 congressional amendment to CSA, which authorized the Attorney General to
revoke a physician's prescription privileges upon the determination that the physician
has "committed such acts as would render his registration . . . inconsistent with the
69
public interest."
According to the amendment, an act is "inconsistent with the public
70
interest" if it, among other things, "threatens the public health and safety."
Attorney
General Ashcroft held that substances prescribed for the purpose of assisting suicide fe11
within the scope of substances prohibited by CSA because physician-assisted suicide
does not serve a "legitimate medical purpose" and is therefore "inconsistent with the
71
public interest."
On November 7, 2001, a doctor, a pharmacist, several terminally ill patients, and
the State of Oregon challenged the Ashcroft Directive in the United States Court for the
District of Oregon.

On April 17, 2002, Judge Robert E. Jones entered a permanent

65. Similar ballot measures had previously been rejected by voters in California and Washington State and
later rejected by voters in Michigan.
66. Or. Rev. Stat.§§ 127.800-127.995 (2005).
67. 66 Fed. Reg. 56607-56608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
68. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)(2005).
69. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4).
70. Jd. at§ 823(f).
71. Ashcroft Directive, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56608; see also Gonzales, Petr.'s Reply Br., 2005 WL 2083964 at
**2-3, 19-20 (Aug. 25, 2005); Gonzales, Petr. ' s Br., supra n. 49, at**18-20.
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On May 7, 2003, Attorney

General Ashcroft appealed the injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. On May 26, 2004, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the
injunction on the ground that the Ashcroft Directive "interferes with Oregon's authority
to regulate medical care within its borders and therefore alter[s] the usual constitutional
73
balance between the States and the Federal Government.'.
On November 9, 2004,
Attorney General Ashcroft, who was succeeded the next day by Alberto R. Gonzales,
4
appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to the United States Supreme Court?
On
75
January 17, 2006, a divided Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision.

2.

The Majority

Justice Kennedy affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision primarily on the ground
that CSA, appropriately interpreted, did not extend to substances prescribed for the
purpose of physician�assisted suicide. Justice Kennedy said very little about physician
assisted suicide itself. But the little he did say is noteworthy:
In the face of the CSA's silence on the practice of medicine generally and its
recognition of state regulation of the medical profession it is difficult to defend the
Attorney General's declaration that the statute· impliedly criminalizes physician-assisted
suicide. . . . A prescription, the Government argues, necessarily implies that the substance
is being made available to a patient for a legitimate medical purpose. The statute, in this
view, requires an anterior judgment about the term "medical" or "medicine."

The

Government contends ordinary usage of these words ineluctably refers to a healing or
curative art, which by these terms cannot embrace the intentional hastening of a patient's
death.

It also points to the teachings of Hippocrates, the positions of prominent medical

organizations, the Federal Government, and the judgment of the [forty-nine] States that
have not legalized physician-assisted suicide as further support for the proposition that the
practice is not legitimate medicine.
On its own, this understanding of medicine's boundaries is at least reasonable. The
primary problem with the Government's argument, however, is its assumption that the
CSA impliedly authorizes an Executive officer to bar a use simply because it may be
inconsistent with one reasonable understanding of medical practice.

Viewed alone, the

prescription requirement may support such an understanding, but statutes "should not be
read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions." The CSA's substantive provisions
and their arrangement undermine this assertion of an expansive federal authority to
76
. .
regu Iate me dtcme.

Justice Kennedy, then, conceded that one "reasonable" interpretation of the purpose of
medicine is to heal, which includes preventing, curing, and curbing illness, disease, and
injury. But implicit in Justice Kennedy's expression "one reasonable understanding of

72. Or. v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (D. Or. 2002).
73 . Jd. at 1124 (quoting Greg01y v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(brackets in original).
74. Gonzales, No. 04-623 (U.S. filed Nov. 9, 2004).
75. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 926.
76. Id. at 924 (citations omitted).
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medical practice" were the assumptions that, in addition to healing, medicine may serve
another reasonabl e purpose, and physician-assisted suicide may be consistent with this
other purpose.

Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy failed to explain what this alternative

legitimate medical purpose might be. Moreover, Justice Kennedy failed to explain how
it might be the case that physician-assisted suicide does not threaten the public health
and safety and is thereby consistent with the public interest.
3.

The Dissent

Justice Scalia's dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
77
The majority's failure to offer a l egitimate

Thomas, capitalized on these omissions.

medical purpose other than healing or an explanation of how physician-assisted suicide
might not threaten the public health and safety left Justice Scalia free to claim victory for
the Attorney General's unchallenged interpretations:

[E]ven if [the Attorney General's] interpretation of ["legitimate medical purpose"] is
entitled to lesser deference or no deference at all, it is by far the most natural interpretation
of [this phrase}-whose validity is not challenged here. This interpretation is thus correct
even upon de

novo

review.

[And] even if that interpretation of ["legitimate medical

purpose"] were incorrect, the Attorney General's independent interpretation of the
statutory

phrase "public interest" in 21 U.S.C. §§ 824(a) and 823(f), and his implicit

interpretation of the statutory phrase "public health and safety" in § 823(f)(5), are entitled
to deference ... and they are valid.

78

Justice Scalia spent most of his opinion explaining why deference should be given
to the Attorney General's interpretation of CSA and of its incompatibility with
physician-assisted suicide. For the most part, he argued that deference was owed to the
Attorney General not necessarily because his interpretations were correct but because
79
both the text of CSA and prior cases-namely A uer v. Robbins
and Chevron US.A.,
81
80
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. -mandated this deference.
Still, Justice Scalia did maintain that, regardless of deference issues, the Attorney
General's interpretations were correct.

In particular, Justice Scalia offered three quick

arguments-or, more precisely, one argument and two assertions-in defense of the
Attorney General's thesis that the only legitimate medical purpose is healing and
therefore that CSA clearly ruled out physician-assisted suicide.

Justice Scalia's only

argument was to reiterate the Attorney General's own appeal to authority. Justice Scalia

stated that "[v]irtually every relevant source of authoritative meaning," including
"virtually every medical authority from Hippocrates to the current American Medical

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Gonzales,

126 S. Ct. at 926 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).

!d. at 926 (citations omitted).

5 1 9 U.S. 452 ( 1 997).
467 u.s. 837 ( 1 984).
In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas also argued that deference should be given to the Attorney

General's interpretations of CSA. Like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that this deference was mandated
by CSA. ld. at 940 (Thomas, J. dissenting). But Justice Thomas also argued that the Supreme Court's decision
in Gonzales

v.

Raich,

545 U.S. I (2005)-a case that entailed the Attorney General's interpretations of
939-4 1 .

CSA-was inconsistent with the majority's decision in Gonzales. !d. at
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82
Association (AMA)," suggests that the sole purpose of medicine is to heal.
The first of
Justice Scalia's assertions was that "[n]ot even those of our Eighth Amendment cases
most generous in discerning an 'evolution' of national standards would have found, on
83
this record, that the concept of 'legitimate medicirte' has evolved so far."
The second
of Justice Scalia's assertions was that healing is the only meaning that "legitimate
medical purpose" could have, and this meaning "surely excludes the prescription of
84
drugs to produce death."
III.

ETHICAL ISSUES

It is not clear whether or not there is a larger significance to Justice Kennedy's
point in Gonzales that there may be legitimate medical purposes other than healing. At
the very least, Justice Kennedy is suggesting that the worry that physician-assisted
suicide is incompatible with a doctor's role as healer is not dispositive, that States may
still permit physician-assisted suicide without necessarily violating the fundamental
purposes of medicine. But is this point also meant to reopen the very door that Vacca
and Glucksberg apparently closed?

Again, Vacca and Glucksberg both held that

terminally ill patients do not have a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. Is
Gonzales meant to be the first step in undoing Vacca and Glucksberg and revisiting this
question?
Of course, we can only speculate as to what the Court's underlying motivations are
and how it will decide future cases questioning the constitutionality of laws either
permitting or prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. This article does not attempt to
engage in any such psychoanalysis or palm reading. Instead, it remains on the safer
ground of argument and textual interpretation. The thesis of this part is that, whether or
not the Court intends to reconsider if tenninally ill patients have a constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide, it has not offered theoretically satisfYing answers to two
critical questions. The first question: does physician-assisted suicide have a legitimate
medical purpose?

The second question: is there a meaningful morally relevant

distinction between physician-assisted suicide, which the Court stated in Vacca and
Glucksberg may be criminalized, and withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment, which
the Court stated in Cruzan is a constitutionally protected right?
A.

Does Physician-Assisted Suicide Have a Legitimate Medical Purpose?
In Glucksberg, there was a scuffle between Justices Kennedy and Scalia over

whether or not physician-assisted suicide serves a legitimate medical purpose.

Justice

Ketmedy suggested that it may but failed to mention what this legitimate medical
purpose might be. And Justice Scalia suggested that the only legitimate medical purpose
is healing and therefore that physician-assisted suicide, which is designed not to heal but
to do the very opposite-kill--falls outside the legitimate boundaries of medicine.

82. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at
Force, supra n. 42, at I05-08.

932; see also Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra n. 6; New York State Task

83. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 932 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
84. Id. at 939.
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The Hippocratic Oath

Justice Scalia based his position that physician-assisted suicide does not serve a
legitimate medical purpose largely on a June 27, 2001 memorandum from the Office of
Legal Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice to Attorney General Ashcroft (OLC
85
The OLC Memorandum derived this position from a number of
86
sources, including the AMA and the American Nurses Association.
These agencies

Memorandum).

themselves relied largely on the Hippocratic Oath.
There are two versions of the Hippocratic Oath-ancient and modem. The ancient
version, which was written in the fifth century B.C. by Hippocrates, states in part that
"[n]either will I administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest
87
such a course."
The modem version, written by Dr. Louis Lasagna in 1 964, states in
part:
Most especially must I tread with care in matters of life and death. If it is given to me to
save a life, all thanks. But it may also be within my power to take a life; this awesome
responsibility must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of my own frailty.
88
Above all, I must not play at God.

The ancient version directly conflicts with physician-assisted suicide.

But there

are several reasons why the ancient version does not present a very strong basis for
current opposition to physician-assisted suicide.

First, candidates for the license to
89
practice medicine no longer recite, or need to recite, the ancient version.
Rather, they
90
generally recite the modem version.
Second, Hippocrates inserted the clause above
("[n]either will I . . . such a course") into the oath largely to "prevent[] physicians from
m
This concern is no longer relevant. Third, there is

participating in political intrigues.'

85. Memo. from U.S. Dept. of Just., Off. of Leg. Counsel, to Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft, Whether Physician
Assisted Suicide Serves a "Legitimate Medical Purpose" under the Drug Enforcement Administration's

27, 2001) Others who base their opposition to
physician-assisted suicide at least in part on the Hippocratic Oath include the Council on Ethical & Jud.
Affairs, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 10 Issues L. & Med. 91 (1994); Willard Gaylin, Leon R. Kass, Edmund D.
Pellegrino & Mark Siegler, "Doctors Must Not Kill", 259 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2139 (1988); John C. Harvey,
Doctors Must Not Kill, Am. J. Ethics & Med. 9 (1993); Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why
Doctors Must Not Kill, 94 Pub. Interest 25 (1989); Kass, supra n. 36, at 31-32; Charles L. Sprung, Changing
Attitudes and Practices in Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatments, 263 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2211 (1990); Avraham
Steinberg, The Terminally Ill--,Secular and Jewish Ethical Aspects, 30 Isr. J. Med. Sci. 130 (1994); see also
Stephen Jamison, Assisted Suicide: A Decision-Making Guide for Health Professionals 20 (Jossey-Bass 1997);
Ernie W.D. Young, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Overview of the Ethical Debate, 166 W. J. Med. 402, 403-04
(1997).
86. OLC Memorandum, supra n. 85, at 11-13. The AMA stated its position in Glucksberg, Amicus Br.,
1996 WL 656263 (Nov. 12, 1996), and in H.R. Subcomm. on Canst. of the H. Comm. on the Jud., Assisted
Suicide in the United States, 104th Cong. 521-66 (Apr. 29, 1996) (testimony of Lonnie L. Bristow, M.D., Pres.,
AMA) (available at 1996 WL 226114). The American Nurses Association stated its position at the same
hearing and in its Position Statement on Assisted Suicide, http:/lwww.nursingworld.org/readroom/
position/ethics/ prtetsuic.htm (Dec. 8, 1994).
87. Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns 5 (Stanley Joel Reiser, Arthur
J. Dyck & William J. Curran eds., student ed., MIT Press 1977).
88. Nova Online, Hippocratic Oath-Modern
Version,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/
oath_modem.html (updated Mar. 2001).
89. Nova Online, The Hippocratic Oath Today: Meaningless Relic or Invaluable Moral Guide,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/ oath_today.html (updated Mar. 2001).
90. /d.
91. Erich H. Loewy, Textbook of Medical Ethics 146 (Plenum Publg. Corp. 1989).
Regulations Implementing the Controlled Substances Act (June

715

GONZALES V. OREGON AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

2007]

no good reason to think that Hippocrates is a definitive, authoritative source on the
fundamental principles of medical ethics.
medical ethicist's view .

92

His view is just as contestable as any other

Fourth, the principles of medical ethics are not necessarily

timeless but rather vary with context, society, and technology. These three things have
dramatically changed since Hippocrates' time.
Unlike the ancient version, the modem version does not clearly rule out physician
assisted suicide. First, to suggest that a physician must "tread with care in matters of life
and death" still leaves open the possibility of a physician' s
patient's life.

carefully

terminating her

Second, the suggestion that the "awesome responsibility" of "tak[ing] a

life" "must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of my own frailty" directly
suggests that the physician must sometimes decide whether or not to take a patient's life,
which itself implies that the physician is sometimes morally permitted to decide in favor
of termination.

Third, if the statement that the physician "must not play at God" were

taken to be a categorical ban on physician-assisted suicide, then it would contradict the
93
Given the
previous statements' implications, which have just been noted above.
previous statements, a more plausible interpretation of this last statement is that the
physician should not make the decision based solely on her own judgment. Rather, she
should also take into account the wishes, interests, and circumstances of the patient and
the patient's family.

Finally, many physicians who have subscribed to the principles

embodied by the Hippocratic Oath believe that physician-assisted suicide is morally
94
permissible.
And it would be both highly cynical and arrogant to think that any, no

92.

This third argument applies not merely to modern society but also to the ancient Greeks themselves.

According to Erich H. Loewy and Roberta Springer Loewy, The Ethics of Terminal Care: Orchestrating the
End of Life I 07 (Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers 2000), many physicians in ancient times did not
subscribe to Hippocrates' medical ethical principles. See also Darrel W. Amundsen, The Significance of
Inaccurate History in Legal Considerations ofPhysician-Assisted Suicide, in Physician-Assisted Suicide 3, 2526 (Robert F. Weir ed., Ind. U. Press 1 997) (maintaining that the early Christians did not categorically reject
the practices of euthanasia, suicide, and physician-assisted suicide but instead barely discussed or considered
them).
93.

Jean Davies makes a very interesting observation in this context:
The emptiness of [assertions like "[ o]nly God can give or take life" and "[w]e cannot play God"] in
relation to actual medical practice can be seen in the determined (and laudable) attempts that are
made to restore to health those hovering on the brink of death by reason of accident or treatable
infection. In fact the whole practice of medicine could be defined as one long struggle to prevent
"Nature taking its course."

Jean Davies, The Case for Legalizing Voluntary Euthanasia, in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and
Legal Perspectives 83, 90 (John Keown ed., Cambridge U. Press 1 995).
94.

Physicians who support physician-assisted suicide include Lofty L. Basta & Carole Post, A Graceful

Exit: Life and Death on Your Own Terms (Insight Bks. 1 996); Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92.

Orentlicher,

supra n. 30, at 666, offers evidence that there is widespread support for physician-assisted suicide among
modern physicians. See also Melinda A. Lee & Susan W. Tolle, Oregon 's Assisted Suicide Vote: The Silver
Lining, 124 Annals Internal Med. 267 ( 1 996). Harold Y. Vanderpool, Doctors and the Dying of Patients in

American History, in Physician-Assisted Suicide 33, 3 7 (Robert F. Weir ed., Ind. U. Press 1 997), points out
that, far from uniformly opposing euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, the medical community has hotly
contested these issues since at least the 1 870s.

Vanderpool also offers the names of many physicians and

medically related organizations that have practiced or advocated euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
since that time.

In more or less chronological order, they include Samuel D. Williams, T.T. Robertson, the

American Association of Progressive Medicine, Alfred Worchester, William Sperry, Walter C. Alvarez, Joseph
Fletcher, Edward H. Rynearson, Frank J. Ayd, Paul Ramsey, Norman L. Cantor, Thomas W. Furlow, Jr., the
1 983 Report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, Sisella Bok, Derek Humphry, the Hemlock Society, and the Unitarian Universalist
Association.
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less all, of these physicians are guilty of either unwitting self-contradiction or false
consciousness.
2.

The Fundamental Purposes of Medicine

When they are not appealing to the Hippocratic Oath, the sources that Justice
Scalia cites in favor of the proposition that healing is the only purpose of medicine
They merely assert that the only
95
purpose of medicine is to heal-to prevent, cure, or curb illness, disease, and injury.
appeal to something even weaker-bald assertion.

This objective clearly conflicts with physician-assisted suicide, which is designed to do
the very opposite-not heal the patient but end her life.
This perspective, however, is myopic. In addition to healing, medicine has at least
one other main purpose: to alleviate physical or emotional suffering. One need merely
96
consider the universal acceptance of palliative care (e.g., hospice treatment).
And
when it comes to terminally ill patients who suffer excruciating pain and wish to die, the
"healing purpose" may conflict with the "alleviation purpose."

That is, a physician

treating a terminally ill patient who is suffering excruciating pain and wishes to die may
not be able to satisfy both purposes. In this limiting case, she may just have to choose
between them. She may just have to violate a fundamental purpose of medicine. On the
one hand, if she opts for healing the patient, she may thereby prolong or intensify the
patient's physical and emotional suffering. On the other hand, the only way in which the
physi cian may be able to alleviate the patient's suffering is by terminating her life. So it
is disingenuous for opponents of physician-assisted suicide to suggest that it violates a
fundamental purpose of medicine. In certain situations, fai/ing to terminate the patient's
97
life might also violate a fundamental purpose of medicine.

Non-physicians who also support physician-assisted suicide include Margaret Pabst Battin, The Least

Worst Death: Essays in Bioethics on the End of Life (Oxford U. Press 1 994); Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The
R ight to Die with Dignity: A n Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and Law (Rutgers U. Press 200 1 ); Davies, supra
n . 93.

95. Gonzales, 1 26 S. Ct. at 931-32 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
96. Even the Ashcroft Directive, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56608, recognizes this point: "Pain management . . . has
long been recognized as a legitimate medical purpose justifying physicians' dispensing of controlled
substances." See also Daniel Callahan, Reason, Self-determination, and Physician-Assisted Suicide, in Foley &

Hendin, supra n. 7, at 59 ("What [medicine] can do is relieve pain and bring comfort to those who
psychologically suffer because of illness."); Kass, supra n. 36, at 2 1 ("[T]he physician is called to serve the
high and universal goal of health while also ministering to the needs and relieving the sufferings of the frail and
particular patient.").

97. See Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 1 84-85, 1 86; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 19-20, 24-25; Loewy &

Loewy, supra n. 92, at 1 1 3-14; Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A Compassionate Resp onse to a Medical
Failure, 327 New Engl. J. Med. 1 384 (1 992); Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. I , at 2230; Ezekiel J.

Emanuel, Euthanasia: Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspectives, 1 54 Archives Internal Med. 1 890, 1 893
( 1 994); institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of Prolonging Life and Assisting Death, 336
Lancet

6 1 0, 6 1 3 (1 990); Winston Nesbitt, Euthanasia and the Distinction between A cts and Omissions, 1 0 J.
30, at 664; Robert F. Weir, The Morality ofPhysician-Assisted
( 1 992). But see Kass, supra n. 36, at 34-35 (challenging Jhe

Applied Phil. 253 (1 993); Orentlicher, supra n.
Suicide, 20 L., Med. & Health Care 1 1 6, 1 2 3

notion that medicine serves the goal, among others, of "helping patients achieve a peaceful death").
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Is There a Morally Relevant Distinction between Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Withdrawal of Lifesaving Medical Treatment?
The Vacca Court held that there is a significant moral (and constitutional)

difference between a doctor's withdrawing

lifesaving medical treatment from a

terminally ill patient and a doctor's prescribing lethal drugs for a terminally ill patient. Is
98
this decision correct? Is there really a difference? If so, what is it?
We have already come across three proposed answers to these questions from
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Vacca opinion. First, while a doctor who prescribes lethal
drugs to her patient intends to help her die, a doctor who withdraws life support from her
patient intends only to respect the patient's autonomy and dignity.

Second, while

physician-assisted suicide involves the patient's dying from the drug prescribed by her
doctor, withdrawal involves the patient's dying from the underlying illness. Third, only
prohibiting withdrawal, not prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, violates the patient 's
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.
1.

The First Distinction: Intent

The first two distinctions are quite weak.

Regarding intent, a physician who

prescribes lethal drugs to her patient is not necessarily, or usually, some evildoer who
rubs her hands together with glee at the prospect that her patient might soon be dead.
And even if we assume that she is, we have no reason not to assume the same about the
doctor who withdraws her patient from life support, in which case this practice should be
illegal as well. If, however, we assume what we should-namely, that the doctor who
fulfills her patient's wishes to remove life support does so almost invariably not from
some evil motive but simply out of a respect and concern for her patient's autonomy
then we have no reason not to assume the very same about the doctor who prescribes
lethal drugs for her patient. We have no reason not to assume that she prescribes lethal
drugs out of the very same respect and concern for her patient ' s autonomy.
may-and

But if we

should-make these assumptions, then Chief Justice Rehnquist 's first

distinction fails.

All else being equal, there is no difference between the intent of a

doctor who removes unwanted lifesaving medical treatment from her patient and the
99
intent of a doctor who prescribes lethal drugs for her patient.
2.

The Second Distinction: Causation

Regarding causation, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated what is undeniable-namely,
that the cause of the death of a patient from whom lifesaving medical treatment is

98. See Dworkin, supra n. 19, at 1 84 (footnote omitted):
[T]he law produces the apparently irrational result that people can choose to die lingering deaths by
refusing to eat, by refusing treatment that keeps them alive, or by being disconnected from
respirators and suffocating, but they cannot choose a quick, painless death that their doctors could
easily provide. Many people, including many doctors, think that this distinction is not irrational but,
on the contrary, essential. They think that doctors should in no circumstances be killers.
many other people, that principle seems cruelly abstract.

99. David Lavalle makes a similar point about the patient 's intent.
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 945, 9 73 (1998)

Suicide: Is There a Right to Die? 31

.

But to

David Lavalle, Physician-Assisted
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withdrawn is her underlying illness. Where Rehnquist went wrong was in assuming that
the cause of such a patient' s death must be confined to only one causal factor. In fact,
there is another-quite obvious-factor that equally contributed to this patient' s death:
removal of her life support.

Once we acknowledge this second, equally important,

causal factor, the purported distinction that Chief Justice Rehnquist drew between
causation by physician-assisted suicide and causation by withdrawal breaks down
entirely. For just as it is misleading to say that the cause of the death of a patient from
whom life support has been removed is her underlying illness, it is equally misleading to
say that the cause of the death of a patient who has admini stered to herself a lethal drug
prescribed by that doctor is the lethal drug.

Clearly, her terminal illness also plays a

causal role. It causes her the great suffering that motivates her to take the drug in the
1 00
first place.
Opponents

of physician-assisted

suicide

might argue that this

overlooks an obvious temporal distinction between the two cases.

description

On the one hand,

when the doctor removes life support, the patient normally does not die immediately.
There is some gap of time, however small, between the removal of life support and the
patient's death. What intervenes in that gap is the patient' s illness. So it is more precise
to say that the patient' s illness is the immediate cause of her death, removal of life
support "only" the distant cause. And in this sense, the cause of the patient' s death is her
illness. The same, however, cannot be said of the patient who commits suicide by means
of a lethal drug prescribed by her doctor.

The immediate cause-and therefore the

cause-of her death is the drug itself, not her illness.
But this is a di stinction without a difference. The point of Rehnquist's distinction
between causation-of-death in the physician-assi sted suicide scenario and causation-of
death in the withdrawal scenario is that the latter is somehow more benign, and therefore
more tolerable, than the former.

But it is arbitrary to make this normative judgment

about benignity or tolerability on the basis of the immediate cause alone.

There is no

good reason to think that the immediate cause alone carries such importance.

On the

contrary, if causation is to be considered at all, this normative judgment should instead
be based not merely on the immediate cause but on the larger process or causal hi story or
chain of events behind this immediate cause. Once we take this larger chain of events
into consideration, we see that the two scenarios should be judged equally.

For both

chains of events share two key features-both of which are sufficient to determine our
normative judgments. First, the patient' s wishes initiate both chains of events. It is the
patient who asks her doctor to remove life support or to prescribe lethal drug s. Second,
in both chains of events, the doctor serves as merely a means to the end of fulfilling the
patient' s wishes.

It does not matter how she fulfills the patient ' s wishes, whether by

removing life support or by prescribing lethal drugs. This is merely a technical issue, not
101
a moral issue.

I 00.

!d. at 973.

101. It might be objected that it does matter how the doctor fulfills the patient 's wishes. Clearly, if the
patient wishes to die, the doctor may not fire a pistol at her. And this is so even if the patient wishes to be shot
to death. But this objection requires only a simple qualification. The doctor must use non-violent means to
achieve the end of fulfilling her patient's wish to die. Prescribing a lethal drug clearly qualifies

as

non-violent
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Opponents of physician-assisted suicide might respond that we should focus
exclusively on the immediate cause of death because that will tell us whether the patient
died from natural causes or from human intervention. And it is clearly preferable that
patients die from natural causes than from human intervention.
While this argument is rhetorically seductive, it is substantively bankrupt.
rhetorically seductive because it relies on very powerful connotations.

It is

But it is

substantively blmkrupt because these connotations are inapplicable in the context of
physician-assisted suicide.

On the one hand,

peacefulness and unavoidability.

connotes violence and avoidability.
inapplicable in this context.

death by natural causes connotes

On the other hand, death by human intervention
But, again, these

connotations

are simply

While a death by prescribed lethal drugs is a death by

human intervention-the doctor and the patient herself-it is certainly not violent. It is
therefore not deplorable, even if it is tragic.

Moreover, if one argues that death by

natural causes is preferable to physician-assisted suicide, then one is in effect making the
arguably cruel suggestion that patients should be forced to endure longer, possibly much
longer, periods of suffering for no better reason than to avoid the pejorative implications
of human intervention, implications that simply do not apply in the context of euthanasia.
Finally, opponents of physician-assisted suicide might argue that the causal
distinction between death by physician-assisted suicide and death by removal of life
support is morally relevant. For a doctor who practices physician-assisted suicide helps
to kill her patient. But a doctor who removes life support from her patient merely lets

her patient die. And there is a clear moral difference between killing and letting die. All
10
else being equal, killing is (much) worse than letting die. 2
There are, however, two problems with this argument against physician-assisted
1 03
suicide. First, not everybody agrees with it.
On the contrary, whether or not, all else
being equal, killing is worse than letting die is a very difficult and hotly contested
104
philosophical question.
Because it is so difficult and contested, it (alone) should not
be allowed to decide the debate on physician-assisted suicide.
Second, in the context of euthanasia, the distinction between killing and letting die

because it does not inflict any external injury on the patient and may be self-administered by the patient.
I 02 . For example, before Vacca went up to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that there is no principled distinction between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment. In particular, it held that New York statutes that allowed the withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment but prohibited physician-assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause. Quill v. Vacca, 80
F.2d 7 1 6, 727 (2d Cir. 1996). For terminally ill patients on life-support systems are simi larly situated to
terminally ill patients who are not. So the only justification for allowing only the former to terminate their
lives would be a rationally related legitimate State interest. !d. at 729. According to the Second Circuit, such
an interest simply does not exist. /d. at 729-30.
103. For example, before Vacca went up to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that there is no principled distinction between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment. In particular, it held that New York statutes that allowed the withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment but prohibited physician-assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause. Quill v. Vacca, 80
F.2d 7 16, 727 (2d Cir. 1 996). For terminally ill patients on life-support systems are similarly situated to
terminally ill patients who are not. So the only justification for allowing only the former to terminate their
lives would be a rationally related legitimate State interest. Jd. at 729. According to the Second Circuit, such
an interest simply does not exist. !d. at 729-30.
I 04. See, for example, the variety of positions represented in Killing and Letting Die (Bonnie Steinbock and
Alastair Norcross, eds., Fordham University Press 1994).
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is not always clear. There are borderline situations that do not fall easily or obviously on
either the "killing side" or the "letting die" side. Indeed, one situation that is not easily
classified as either a killing (a positive action bringing about another's death) or a letting
die (a failing to prevent another's death by refraining from performing a life-saving
action) is withdrawal of life support itself. On the one hand, it may seem to be a letting
die because, in terminating the life support, the physician is failing to prevent the
patient's impending death.

On the other hand, it may seem to be a killing because

terminating the life support involves a positive action by the physician.
The underlying problem is that we have no principled basis for determining the
proper baseline--namely, whether or not the patient is already moving toward death. On
the one hand, if we deem the patient already to be moving toward death, then the life
support system constitutes an active interference. It does not continue but interrupts the
movement.

So if the physician terminates the life support, she merely removes this

interruption and thereby lets the movement toward death continue. And to say that she
lets the movement toward death continue is just to say that she lets the patient die. On
the other hand, if we deem the patient not already to be moving toward death, then the
physician's removing the life support system constitutes an active interference.

She

actively interrupts the patient's movement toward more life, in which case she may be
said to kill the patient.
3.

The Third Distinction: The Consequences of Prohibition

Finally,

Chief

Justice

Rehnquist's

third

distinction-that

prohibiting

only

withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment, not physician-assisted suicide, would violate
patients' "well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from
105
unwanted touching"
-fails because it falsely assumes that the constitutional right to
withdraw unwanted

lifesaving medical

treatment

derives

from "well-established,

traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching." In fact, the
majority opinion in Cruzan, which was also written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, did not
really advance this proposition. Instead, Cruzan stated that patients' right to withdraw
lifesaving medical treatment derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
106
Clause, which secured their"liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatrnent."
So the right to withdraw unwanted lifesaving treatment was thought to derive not from a
concern to protect bodily integrity per se but rather from a concern to protect liberty,
107
which may safely be translated as a right to self-determination.
Indeed, the text of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Cruzan contains only one mention of "bodily
integrity," as contrasted with thirteen mentions of"liberty interest."
Given this clarification, Rehnquist's third distinction collapses. Even if prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide does not violate terminally ill patients' bodily integrity, it
might still violate their right to self-determination.

Because it might violate this right

just as much as does prohibiting withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment, and because

105. Vacca, 521 U.S. at 807 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79,287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
106. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
107. See also Rawls et al., supra n. 8, at 44 ("The liberty interest at stake in Cntzan was a more profound
one" than "a right to reject an unwanted invasion of one's body.").
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prohibiting withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment is unconstitutional precisely
because it violates this right, it follows that prohibition of physician-assisted suicide
1 08
might very well be unconstitutional as wel1.
One might object that this point leads to an absurdity. If terminally ill patients had
a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, then the State would be equally
constitutionally obligated to provide a physician to each patient who sought this
treatment and did not already have a doctor of her own. But is difficult to accept the
notion that States would be constitutionally obligated to provide this affirmative medical
assistance-especially when, for better or worse, they do not otherwise have a
1 09
constitutional obligation to provide health care to those who cannot afford it.
The appropriate response to this objection is that constitutional protection of
physician-assisted suicide would not entail the positive right to be provided with a doctor
if need be. Rather, it would entail only the negative right of non-interference-i.e., the
right that States not interfere with any arrangements for physician-assisted suicide made
1 10
by patients with their own doctors.
IV.

POLICY ISSUES

Even though the Court ruled in Vacca and Glucksberg that patients do not have a
constitutionally protected right to receive physician-assisted suicide, it does not at all
follow that States should prohibit physician-assisted suicide. There are many actions and
activities that are not constitutionally protected and yet are-and should be-perfectly
legal. For example, individuals do not have a constitutional right to drive (no less have)
a car.

Yet it would be foolish for any State to interpret this absence of constitutional

protection as a good reason to outlaw driving. In this respect, physician-assisted suicide
is like driving.

While we do not currently have a constitutional right to it, some

advocates of physician-assisted suicide argue that we should still be permitted this option
if we are ever in the unfortunate position of facing a future of unrelenting pain before a
certain death.
Why, then, does every State but Oregon still prohibit physician-assisted suicide?
While some opposition to legalizing physician-assisted suicide may be rooted in some of

108. See also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 298-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting Chief Justice Rehnquist's third
distinction because its assumption that the State may not violate a patient's bodily integrity to save her life is
both question-begging and, in many cases, false). Respondents in Vacca offered another argument against the
third distinction:
[Patients who have previously consented to bodily intrusions such as insertion of an artificial heart
valve or a kidney or bone marrow transplant] may wish to die by withdrawing their consent to the
bodily intrusion to which they have been subjected. But their cases demonstrate that the State's line
is not about permitting patients to undo a battery. Even where withdrawal of consent is theoretically
possible, the State would doubtless say that a patient has no right to end his own life by insisting, for
example, that surgeons remove a donor kidney or heart that had already been implanted. On the
other hand, if the State did permit this type of life-ending physician assistance, how could it argue
that it is rational not to permit the same patient to obtain a lethal dose of medication from a
physician for the same ultimate purpose?
Vacco, Respt. 's Br., supra n.

1 09.

See, e.g. Harris

v.

60, at 47 (emphasis in original).
448 U.S. 297, 3 1 7- 1 8 ( 1 980) (The Due Process Clause does not impose an

McRae,

obligation on the government to fund abortions or other medical services.).

1 1 0. Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 664.
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the weaker arguments that we have encountered above-e.g., physician-assisted suicide,
unlike withdrawal of unwanted life support, involves killing or the intent to kill-the
stronger arguments derive less from moral considerations and more from a practical
worry. The practical worry is that legalizing physician-assisted suicide will have serious
negative effects on patients, physicians, medical practice, and society in general. This
part will explicate what these negative effects might be.

A.

The Strongest Policy Arguments for Physician-Assisted Suicide
It would help first to see the strongest policy arguments for physician-assisted

suicide. Suppose an elderly woman-Lisa-is terminally ill with no chance of recovery,
suffers excruciating pain, and has decided, after much careful thought and deliberation
with her family and friends, that she wishes to die.

Suppose also that Lisa does not

depend on artificial life support; has no more than six months to live; is not pressured or
coerced by anybody else to end her life; and is fully conscious and mentall� competent.
So far, Lisa's decision to commit suicide-whether physician-assisted or not-seems as
111
rational and voluntary as such a decision can ever be.
Committing suicide would
maximize Lisa's autonomy by maximizing her control over how and when her
impending death occurs; both Lisa' preference for no suffering to suffering and her belief
that death is the only means to this end are reasonable; and Lisa reasonably believes that
her family supports her decision for the right reasons-because they too wish her
suffering to end and not to spare them the burden of taking care of her or save them the
expense of Lisa's continued medical care.
What, then, justifies the inference from the fact that Lisa's decision to commit
suicide is rational and voluntary to the conclusion that physician-assisted suicide is
warranted? Why should Lisa's method of suicide involve a physician's prescription of a
lethal medication? Why can't Lisa terminate her life in some other way? An analogy
with abortion might help to answer these questions. Most "pro-choice" advocates-i.e.,
advocates for keeping the option of abortion legal-argue that if abortion were made
illegal, many pregnant women would then seek "back-alley" abortions. And back-alley
abortions are undesirable for two primary reasons, one practical, the other moral.

The

practical reason is that the individuals performing the back-alley abortions are likely to
lack the knowledge, skill, and resources necessary to perform safe abortion procedures
and would therefore expose these women to serious bodily injuries. The moral reason is

I l l . It has been suggested to me in personal conversation that a patient's decision to terminate her life while
undergoing a sharp surge of pain is not rational . My response to this point is that the patient's decision is
rational if the patient has been informed by her doctor that she is terminally ill and can reasonably expect to
suffer this level of pain, either constantly or continuously, until death. Moreover, even if this decision is
irrational, all fifty States allow such alleged irrationality in the case of withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment. Scholars who accept the proposition that a patient can rationally request physician-assisted suicide
include Robert L. Barry, Breaking the Thread of Life: On Rational Suicide (Transaction Publishers 1 994) and
Jamison, supra n. 85, at 42 ("The overwhelming majority of mental health professionals, according to surveys
conducted by James Werth and Barbara Liddle, believe that individuals can make rational decisions to control
the time and manner of their deaths."); see also Justice Stevens' concurrence in Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 747
(patients may make a "rational and voluntary decision to seek assistance in dying."). Scholars who reject this
proposition (i.e., those who accept what Jamison, supra n. 85, at 4 1 , refers to as the "traditional view") include
Callahan, supra n. 96, at 66-67; Kathleen Foley (testifying before Congress in 1 996), Herbert Hendin (of The
American Suicide Foundation), Kass, supra n. 36, at 24-25.
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that the illegal status of these abortions would imply that society rega,rds abortions in
general-and therefore the women undergoing these back-alley abortions-as morally
reprehensible.

And pro-choice advocates reject both this moral conclusion and the

assumption that society endorses this moral conclusion.
Advocates of physician-assisted suicide would likely argue that keeping this
practice illegal produces practical dangers and conveys the wrong message.

The

practical danger is that patients will seek to end their lives in ways that may not be
effective, thereby complicating their situation
patients'-and their families'-suffering.
physician-assisted suicide illegal is that it is

and quite possibly increasing the

And the message conveyed by keeping

wrong for doctors

to help patients like Lisa

end their lives. But advocates of physician-assisted suicide argue that Lisa's doctor is
doing the

right thing by

decision.

helping Lisa to execute her fully rational and family-supported

That is precisely what doctors

should

do.

After all, doctors routinely

implement, as they should, their patients' decisions to terminate lifesaving medical care
and administer palliative but death-hastening treatment.

And there is no principled

distinction between these two methods and physician-assisted suicide. In all three
situations, a patient asks her doctor to help alleviate her suffering, and the doctor respects
her patient's request by prescribing, dispensing, and/or administering to her patient a
drug that has the reasonably foreseeable effect of causing the patient to die earlier than
she would have without the drug.
Moreover, physician-assisted suicide has a distinctive advantage over withdrawal
of lifesaving medical treatment and administration of palliative but death-hastening
treatment: it liberates the patient from any sense that she is committed to carrying
through with her decision to terminate her life.

If a patient decides to administer the

lethal substance to herself, she may still change her mind before executing her decision
without worrying that this change of mind will yield any negative consequences. But if a
patient asks her doctor to withdraw treatment or administer palliative but death-hastening
treatment, she may feel reluctant to change her mind for fear of disappointing or
bothering the doctor and losing eligibility for the same treatment the next time she
requests it.
B.

1 12

The Undue Pressure Argument
While the policy arguments for physician-assisted suicide in Part IV.A are strong,

I 1 2. Brody uses this same psychological point to argue that if physician-assisted suicide is allowed, the
lethal substance should be administered by the patient herself rather than by the doctor. See Brody, supra n.

97, at 1 386. But see Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 1 02, at 249-50 ("Because of either patient condition or incorrect
dosing, many patients will be unable to swallow or keep the pills down. This raises the probability that
assistance beyond prescribing lethal medications will be essential and may even suggest that active euthanasia,
or lethal injection, would be more effective and likely would seem more humane. Furthermore, the question of
how to deal with a failed attempt remains, particularly if that act has rendered the patient worse off or unable to
request or complete another attempt."); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Compassion Is Not Enough, in Foley & Hen din,
supra n. 7, at 46 ([l]n fact, self-administered prescriptions may fai l in a significant number of cases. As a
result, the act of dying may be prolonged and unpleasant. The dose of the lethal medication may well have to
be repeated or replaced by direct euthanasia. If this is so, it would require the physician to administer the dose,
or to be present and ready to accelerate death more directly if the first effort fails. Assisted suicide quickly
becomes direct and active euthanasia with the transfer of power from the patient to the physician - the
antithesis of the expression of autonomy so many seek.").
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they are not strong enough.

They are counteracted by even stronger policy arguments

against physician-assisted suicide. Importantly, the latter arguments apply with greater
force to physician-assisted suicide than to withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment or
palliative but death-hastening treatment, a point that will be defended in Part IV.F
The Undue Pressure Argument predicts that legalizing physician-assisted suicide
will put serious financial pressure on terminally ill patients, especially terminally ill
patients who are poor, to choose this option rather than the option of lifesaving medical
treatment.

Because physician-assisted suicide will be significantly cheaper than life

sustaining treatments, it is highly likely that Medicare and Medicaid officials, health and
life insurance companies, viatica! settlement companies, and managed care plans-all of
which are concerned at least to minimize their costs and possibly to maximize their
profits-will much more frequently recommend against lifesaving medical treatment
than they would have if the much cheaper option of physician-assisted suicide were not
113
available as a legal alternative.
Needless to say, this situation would be highly undesirable.

We do not want

patients choosing-no less being forced to choose-physician-assisted suicide simply for
financial considerations. For, first, financial considerations are simply the wrong kind of
basis for decisions that have such significant non-financial-i.e., personal, inter
personal, and spiritual/religious-significance and ramifications.

Second, the financial

pressure may be so overwhelming that it would render many less affluent patients'
1 14
decisions to elect physician-assisted suicide non-voluntary and non-consensua!.
This financial pressure will only be compounded by psychological pressure as
well.

Too many terminally ill patients wish to die because they feel--or, worse, have
115
Legalizing
been made to feel-like annoying nuisances to their families and doctors.
physician-assisted suicide would simply intensify this guilt and therefore the "subtle
coercion" on these patients to take this now legally available route.

When physician

assisted suicide is illegal, patients do not have to justify their failure to exercise this
option.

It is simply not an option in the first place.

If anything, they would have to

justify why they still wish to die in spite of this legal roadblock.

But if physician

assisted suicide were legalized, then the burden would suddenly fall on patients to justify
why they are continuing to live-and thereby inconveniencing everybody around them
for the indefinite future-rather than choosing this now legally available alternative.
And they will feel themselves unable to satisfy this burden precisely because they will
have internalized the attitude of rejection that they perceive all around them. They will
deem themselves unworthy of continued existence precisely because everybody else
1 16
around them deems them unworthy of continued existence.

1 1 3. See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 1 02, at 238-39; Stephanie Graboyes-Russo, Too Costly to Live: The Moral
Hazards of a Decision in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacca v. Quill, 5 1 U. Miami L. Rev. 907, 91 9-924
(1 997); Jamison, supra n. 85, at 37.
1 1 4. See Graboyes-Russ o, supra n. 1 26, at 925-27.
1 1 5. See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. I 02, at 257-59; Graboyes-Russo, supra n. 126, at 925-28; Jamison, supra
n. 85, a t 37; Kass, supra n. 36, at 22-30; Pellegrino, supra n. 85, at 48.
1 1 6. See Kass, supra n. 36, at 24; Martha Minow, Which Question? Which Lie? Reflections on the
Physician-A ssisted Suicide Cases, 1 997 S. Ct. Rev. I , 2 1 (One of two "lies" the Court told in Vacca and
Glucksberg was that permitting physician-assisted suicide "would not systematically and routinely be used to
push dying people into death. . . .

[T]he problem arises from the inauguration of a regime in which people

GONZALES V. OREGON AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

2007]

C.

725

The Too Early Argument
The patients who would feel themselves unable to satisfy this burden (of justifying

their continuing to live) would then be dying too early-too early relative to when they
1 17
would have died had their preferences been optimized.
As a society, we simply don't
want people choosing to die prematurely for the wrong reasons. And one very wrong
reason would include a sense of worthlessness, a sense that one is not worth the
inconvenience and financial hardships that one's continuing to live might impose on
118

others.

Of course, an advocate of physician-assisted suicide might respond that even if the
Too Early Argument applies to some patients, it does not apply to Lisa.

Therefore if

physician-assisted suicide were legalized, it should be restricted to patients in Lisa's
situation-again, terminally ill with no chance of recovery, less than six months to live,
and suffering excruciating pain.
Even then, however, Lisa may be dying too early. If she is suffering excruciating
pain, death is not the only possible means of escape. She still has the option of palliative
care. And if she, for some reason, does not have this option, then she should be given it.
For this approach would enable Lisa to overcome her pain and thereby to enjoy another
day, another week, another month, or even another six months of life. Physician-assisted
suicide wipes out this possibility entirely. It simply destroys the possibility of recovery
and, with it, the prospect of continuing a life of value.
There are very few situations in which palliative care, when made available, is
119
Unfortunately, it is not always

insufficient to alleviate a patient 's pain and suffering.

would have to justify continuing to live. Rooting the permission in a right or protected interest . . . would not
save individuals from pressures to die imposed directly or indirectly by family members, physicians, managed
care providers, or the patients' own sense of guilt and burden." (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original)).
These arguments are especially applicable to terminally ill patients who are disabled. See Diane Coleman, Not
Dead Yet, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7; Evan J. Kemp, Jr., Could You Please Die Now? Disabled People Like
Me Have Good Reason to Fear the Push for Assisted Suicide, Wash. Post C l (Jan. 5, 1997); Julie G. Madorsky,
Is the S/ippe1y Slope Steeper for People with Disabilities? 166 W. J. Med. 410 (1997); Anita Si lvers,
Protecting the Innocents: People with Disabilities and Physician-Assisted Dying, 1 66 W. J. Med. 407 (1997).
117. See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102 , at 241.
118. For different versions of the Too Early Argument, see Harvey M. Chochinov and Leonard Schwartz,
Depression and the Will to Live in the Psychological Landscape of Terminally Ill Patients, in Foley & Hendin,
supra n. 7; Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 243, 247, 257-59; Coleman, supra n. 129, at 224; Council on Ethical
& Jud. Affairs, supra n. I , at 2231; Kass, supra n. 36, at 36; Cicely Saunders, A Hospice Perspective, in Foley
& Hendin, supra n. 7, at 289.
119. See Callahan, supra n. 96, at 65; Cohn & Lynn, supra n. I 02, at 258; Kass, supra n. 36, at 23. Still, it
must be acknowledged that in at least some situations, even the most advanced palliative care fails to reduce
patients' suffering to a tolerable level. See Justice Breyer's concurrence in G/ucksberg, 521 U.S. at 791-92;
Brief ofthe Coalition of Hospice Professionals in Vacca and Glucksberg, 1996 WL 709342 at **6-7 (Dec. 10,
1996); Brody, supra n. 97, at 1385; Michael H. Levy, Medical Management of Cancer Pain, in Principles and
Practice of Pain Management 235 (Carol A. Warfield ed., McGraw Hill 1993); New York State Task Force on
Life and Law, supra n. 42, at 40; Rawls et al., supra n. 8, at 44; Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case
of Individualized Decision Making, 3 2 N. Eng. J. Med. 691, 694 (Mar. 1991); Timothy E. Quill, Christine K.
Cassel, & Diane E. Meier, Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 327 N. Eng. J. Med. 1 380, 1 3 83 (Nov. 1 992); Student Author, supra n. 36, at 247 n. 98; Vacca,
Respt.'s Br., supra n. 60, at 8-9.
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made available.

1 20

But this is not an argument for physician-assisted suicide. This is an

argument for improving the current situation and extending adequate palliative care to
121

every patient who needs it.

Too many patients like Lisa wish to die because they suffer less from physical pain
and more from "psychic" pain-i.e., because they are depressed, hopeless, or terrified.
Once again, death is not the only means of escape from these feelings.

Not only

palliative care but also adequate psychiatric care, in conjunction with love and support
from family and friends, provides a more desirable means.

This is a more desirable

means because, unlike an early death, it serves intrinsically desirable ends. Psychiatric
care can help patients like Lisa to enjoy life again, recognize how valued and valuable
they are, conquer their despair, fulfill more goals, indulge in pleasant memories, come to
terms with their past failures, make amends for previous misdeeds, reconcile with people
they may have neglected or cut off, share more quality time with their family and friends,
122
and generally find greater meaning in their lives and experiences.
Unfortunately, like
palliative care, adequate psychiatric care is not always made available either. But once
again, this is not an argument for physician-assisted suicide.

It is an argument for

extending adequate psychiatric care to every patient who needs it.

D.

The Trust Argument
The Trust Argument proceeds in two parts.

123

The first part suggests that a patient

is entitled to believe that her physician has her best interests in mind.

Without this

entitlement, she will be less likely to confide in her physician. And the less likely she is
to confide in her physician, the less likely she will be to give her physician all of the
information that the physician needs in order to give her optimal treatment.

All else

being equal, then, there is a direct correlation between the level of a patient's trust in her
physician and the level of medical care that she receives. Whatever works to diminish
the former will also work to diminish the latter.
The second part of the Trust Argument suggests that if physician-assisted suicide
were legalized, then diminished trust and inferior medical care would likely result.

If

physician-assisted suicide were legalized, then a patient who is, or even just appears to
be, terminally ill might very well worry that her physician secretly intends to kill her
either because the physician thinks that killing the patient is in the patient' s best interest
or because the physician regards the patient' s continued existence as an unnecessary
burden on the doctor herself, on the patient's family, or on society.
patient may not tell her physician everything she needs to know.

As a result, the

Indeed, she may even

1 20. See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 241, 243-44; Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7, at 2, 3-4, 14.
1 2 1 . See Chochinov and Schwartz, supra n. 1 3 1 , at 269-70; Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 243-44, 260;
Kathleen Foley, Compassionate Care, Not Assisted Suicide, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7; Graboyes-Russo,
supra n. 1 26, at 934; Kass, supra n. 36, at 36; Pellegrino, supra n. 85, at 50; Saunders, supra n. 1 3 1 , at 285-86,
289.
1 22. See Chochinov & Schwartz, supra n. 1 3 1 , at 270-77; Kass, supra n . 36, at 38-39; Pellegrino, supra n.
85, at 50; Saunders, supra n. 1 3 1 , at 287-88, 290-9 1.
1 23. F o r similar versions o f the Trust Argument, see Cohen-Aimagor, supra n. 94, at 200; Council on
Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. 1, at 2232; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 34-35; Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at
1 1 6; Gaylin et al., supra n. 85; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, supra n. 42, at 1 05-06; Kass,
supra n. 36, at 27-29; Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 664.
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refrain from seeing a physician altogether.

E.

The Slippery Slope Argument
Finally, the Slippery Slope Argument makes an e ven more ominous pred ict io n

than do the Undue Pressure Argument and the Trust Argument.

The Slippory Slope

mesanae
m an y physicians will end up

Argument predicts that if physician-assisted suicide is lega l i zed then both the
,

of this legal measure itself as well as the fact that some or

killing their patients will ultimately change society 's view of phys i c i a ns and oncmte
1 24
Once ph ys icia n ass i s te d suicide
deva&tating psychological and sociological problems.
-

has the stamp of lawfulness, both the physicians who implement it as we l l us their
colleagues will increasingly tend to regard killing as "not so bad," a "necessary ovil.'f
And as the practice becomes more and more commonplace, some of them mig ht even
come to regard such killings as useful.

Some more opportunistic (and malevolent)

physicians might come to regard physician-assisted suicide as an all-too-convenient
means of "weeding out" the "weakest" or "least desirable" members of society. Inspired
by their ideas of what society should look like and their notions about who belongs and
who does not, they may actually use their positions of authority to pressure vulnerable
patients who were otherwise opposed to dying to change their minds. Even worse, they
may attempt to manipulate patients who were not even terminally ill in the first place to
1 25

consider the option.

This is called the Slippery Slope Argument because it predicts that the legalization
of physician-assisted suicide will generate a slippery slope toward a much greater
1 26
number of premature deaths.
Indeed, as proponents of the Slippery Slope Argument
1 27
contend, precisely this situation occurred in Nazi Germany.
What started out as a
"small" euthanasia program designed to kill "only" the most feeble-minded members of
society eventually grew into the Final Solution.

It has been well-documented that

underlying this dramatic expansion in social engineering was an equally dramatic
1 28
transformation in physicians' attitudes toward life, death, and killing.
The more
commonplace and socially accepted killing by physicians became, the more inured they
became to the act of killing itself. And the more inured they became to the act of killing,
the more inclined they were to broaden their conceptions of "weak," "undesirable," and
"unworthy of life" to include members of society other than the mentally incompetent.
This "brutalization" or "desensitization" to the value of human life eventually
spread in part from physicians to society in general.

Because physicians tended

1 24. See Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 1 1 5-16; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, supra
42, at 1 07, 109, 1 1 2-13.
1 25. See Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 1 88-89; Davies, supra n. 93, at 90; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 43;
Kass, supra n. 36, at 23-28; Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 1 21-24; The Euthanasia Report 4 (1 988).
126. See Callahan, supra n. 96, at 61 ; Cohen-Aimagor, supra n. 94, at 1 88-89; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 3639; Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 1 08-09, 1 24-26; George J . Annas, The Promised End-Constitutional
Aspects of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 683 ( 1 996); Herbert Hendin, Chris Rutenfrans &
Zbigniew Zylicz, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Lessons from the Dutch, 277
J. Am. Med. Assn. 1 720 ( 1 997); Madorsky, supra n. 1 29; Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 664.
1 27. See e.g. Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 1 24-26; Sprung, supra n. 85, at 221 4-15.
1 28. See generally Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide
(Basic Books 1 986).
n.
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increasingly to regard certain human beings as "life unworthy of life," and because
physicians commanded such high respect, their attitudes and actions inevitably helped to
soften the rest of society's opposition to killing. Of course, physicians in Nazi Germany
were aided by other societal forces such as propaganda, ethnic prejudice, and tenor. But
the point remains that physicians played an instrumental role in helping to bring about
129
the changes in attitude that would eventually make the Holocaust possible.
F.

Why These Arguments Apply with Greater Force to Physician-Assisted Suicide than

to Withdrawal of Lifesaving Medical Treatment
The main reason that physician-assisted suicide constitutes more of a threat than
withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment is because, all else being equal, it is
psychologically less difficult-easier-for a doctor to carry out.

Physician-assisted

suicide is easier because it helps to increase the "distance" between the doctor's actions
and the patient's death. While withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment requires the
doctor to perform acts that lead directly to the patient's demise, physician-assisted
suicide permits the doctor merely to write a prescription and let the patient "do the
rest" -i.e ., administer the lethal substance to herself.

As a result, legalization of

physician-assisted suicide is likely to lead to the result that some, and therefore too
many, patients are permitted to die not for the right reason-i.e., because they fall into
the very small category of terminally ill patients for whom adequate palliative care is
medically unavailable-but rather for the wrong reason that their doctors simply have
less psychological resistance to this option.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the United States Supreme Court declined in Vacco and Glucksberg to
extend constitutional protection to physician-assisted suicide, it recently held in Gonzales
that States may still legalize physician-assisted suicide. So as things stand now, whether
or not a given patient has the legal right to elect physician-assisted suicide depends on
what her state legislature has said on the matter. So far, only Oregon has legalized this
practice. The other forty-nine States have not. If the position taken by this article is
con-ect, the other forty-nine States should not follow Oregon's example primarily for
policy reasons.
Still, this is hardly a categorical stance.
reasons can be undermined by empirical data.

Unlike strictly ethical reasons, policy
So where we go from here largely

depends on what has happened, and is happening, in Oregon, the United States' very
130
own physician-assisted-suicide "laboratory."
If an objective assessment of the data-

129. See Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 190. Brian Kalt discusses the implications of physician-assisted

suicide for the "ethical integrity of the medical profession," which he abbreviates as "EIMP." See generally

Brian C. Kalt, Death, Ethics, and the State, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy

487 (2000).
130. Much work has already been done in this area. For essays that offer a negative assessment of the

Oregon experience, see Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin, The Oregon Experiment, in Foley & Hendin,
supra n. 7; N. Gregory Hamilton, Oregon 's Culture of Silence, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7; David W.
Kissane, Deadly Days in Darwin, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7. For a more sanguine assessment primarily of
physici an-assisted suicide in the Netherlands, secondarily of physici an-assisted suicide in Oregon, see Amanda
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including physician surveys, psychiatric reports, and family and patient interviews
indicates that too many patients have exercised physician-assisted suicide for the wrong
reasons (e.g., treatable pain or depression or worries about being a nuisance or economic
burden to one' s family), then this practice should not only not be adopted elsewhere but
should be abandoned in Oregon as well.

Otherwise, if an objective assessment of the

data indicates that the "Oregon experiment" has succeeded and physician-assisted
suicide has been chosen only by the small minority of patients for whom palliative and
psychiatric care was provided but still failed sufficiently to alleviate their suffering, then
it should arguably remain legal in Oregon and be adopted by other States, as long as the
same restrictions and safeguards are carefully codified and strictly enforced.

Gardner, Dutch Euthanasia Rates Steady After Legalization, available at http://www.medicinenet.com/script/
main/art.asp?articlekey=8 1 027.

